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A TALE OF TWO TOWNSHIPS
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY AND VIOLENT AND
NON-VIOLENT LOCAL CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA
Alex Park, MACALESTER COLLEGE

A number of recent gains in social science have found that periods of violent civil
disorder marked by chaos may actually exhibit an underlying order and a rationale on part of
perpetrators in response to specific political conditions of the time. The conjecture is that
violent control emerges as a grassroots effort to establish authority in areas experiencing a
vacuum of central authority. Given those conditions, can these same theories of violence be
applied to incidents of widespread non-violent control as well, where and when the political
conditions are similar? Using a variety of accounts, from research conducted by human rights
groups and media outlets and government data, this paper considers the actions of residents in
two townships in South Africa during a twenty-day period of xenophobic violence in May 2008.
While one township acted violently against its immigrant population, the other mobilized to
protect its own immigrants. These actions are considered within a similar theoretical framework
to demonstrate how both constituted an assertion of local control in the interests of residents
during a time of political instability at the national level.

“The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born;
in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass.”
(Antonio Gramsci 1996: 33)

For twenty days in May 2008, impoverished black townships in cities throughout South Africa
experienced an unprecedented wave of xenophobic violence which left 62 people dead and over
30,000 internally displaced (HRW 2008). The events added insult to an injured and, by many
readings, inept president, all but ensuring the ascendancy of his longtime rival only months later
(Kagwanja 2008).
The period garnered significant attention in both local and international news media and
the South African government. The attacks began in the Alexandra Township in Johannesburg,
Gauteng Province, but within days, events there were replicated in similar episodes of violence
in townships and city centers throughout the nation. A few commentators spoke of a nationwide
uprising of the urban poor against a common, if illusionary immigrant enemy (Mngxitama 2008).
Analysts at most media and human rights groups took a more conventional approach, pointing to
a presumed connection between high poverty and high violence, and the increasing prevalence of
poor immigrants, especially from Zimbabwe. Historically, the black townships of South Africa
were the location of some of its most desperate poverty, and township residents were prone to act
violently, either against state agents (during the Apartheid era) or against each other, in the form
of crime. Additionally, since the end of Apartheid in 1994, a majority of native South Africans,
but especially townships residents, had been known to harbor increasingly strong anti-immigrant
sentiments (HSRC 2008:16). Occasionally, conflict between immigrants and natives had turned
violent, though never on the scale exhibited in May 2008. Nonetheless, many observers of that
period assumed that whatever tensions that had existed between immigrants and natives in the
townships before had simply reached their height in the townships that year, perhaps because the
increasing rate of immigration had reached a certain breaking point. The culprit, it was said, was
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merely the confluence of poverty, a tendency towards violence, and the proximity of immigrants
to these poor, dangerous people.
But a reality which this reading ignores is that not every impoverished township in South
Africa violently evicted its immigrant population in May. One in particular, the township of
Khutsong, less than fifty kilometers southwest of Alexandra, did not report a single incident for
the entire period (Carletonville Herald 2008). In fact, local community leaders there arranged for
the protection of immigrants en masse, and residents staged massive shows of solidarity in the
township’s streets (Mngxitama 2008). What is remarkable is that Khutsong had its own large
population of foreign immigrants, proportionally comparable to Alexandra’s, and, by a number
of measures, the township was as poor as and more prone to violence than Alexandra.
Here, we have a problem: the residents of one township worked very hard to either expel
or murder foreign immigrants in their community. During the same period, another township,
culturally and conditionally similar to the first, mobilized to protect its immigrants. These facts
alone challenge any generalized notion we might adopt which would attribute the difference in
outcome to poverty or cultural conditions.
Alternatively, I propose an analysis that connects the violence to the broader political
interests at work in either of the two townships. A campaign of protection in Khutsong began as
a reaction to the campaign of violence in Alexandra, but the political processes at work were
fundamentally the same in both. In either township, native residents used the treatment of their
immigrant populations to gain leverage on the common source of their grievances: the national
government. The choice to act was not coincidental. Both townships mobilized at a particularly
opportune time, when government leaders were weak, divided, and in the middle of a stagnated
transitional period.
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At the time of the period of violence, the leadership of the national government was in a
crisis for the first time since the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), had taken
power at the end of Apartheid in 1994. Having failed to deliver on a number of key promises,
President Thabo Mbeki’s title was being challenged from within his own party by longtime rival
and president of the ANC, Jacob Zuma, making Mbeki a lame duck in office. By May 2008, it
was obvious to all that Mbeki was on the way out and Zuma was on the way in, but neither had
reached his destined place. The emergent national political climate was one governed from two
centers of gravity and wrought with instability. To take a line from Gramsci, the old was dying
and the new could not be born, resulting in a variety of “morbid phenomena” in the townships,
including widespread anti-immigrant violence (Gramsci 1996:33).
Using data on housing, crime, and immigrant distribution patterns, in combination, I lay a
structural framework for assessing the socio-economic makeup of Khutsong and Alexandra and
the varying affects of immigrant settlement on those conditions. On that structural foundation, I
propose a micro-political narrative for each township as they relate to the macro-political epic of
South African president Mbeki’s declining, and ANC president Zuma’s expanding influence in
the national political arena— two interconnected narratives which had profound reverberations
in both Khutsong and Alexandra.
Opportunities worth Exploiting: a Theoretical Framework for Discussion
While some accounts of incidents of inter-ethnic group violence attribute the motives of
the perpetrators involved to a fundamental and longstanding conflict between parties, recently,
social scientists have begun to criticize this approach for being too narrow. In the last three
decades, some analyses of violent ethnic conflicts have invested heavily in the cultural “roots” of
the case conflict to show how the parties involved were conditioned to hate each other leading up
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to the transition to violence. At least one analyst has even proposed that perpetrators of earlier
cases of xenophobic violence in South Africa were culturally predisposed towards violence (see
Valji 2003:1). These “culturalist” perspectives fail in a number of areas. Brubaker and Laitin
argue that the transition from non-violence to violence is a “phase-shift” deserving independent
theoretical consideration, and cannot be explained away as the mere culmination of an otherwise
non-violent conflict (426). “Violence is not a quantitative degree of conflict but a qualitative
form of conflict, with its own dynamics” (Brubaker & Laitin 1998: 426). From a culturalist
perspective, that “phase shift” is effectively ignored (Brubaker & Laitin 1998: 426).
Culturalist perspectives also significantly limit an understanding of the instrumentality of
violence in a particular conflict. A group’s choice to employ violence should not be considered a
self-explanatory decision (Brubaker & Laitin 1998: 426) and its instrumentality is not universal
in either time or location. Therefore, knowing why violence was employed as a tactic within a
particular conflict and at a particular time is as important as knowing why other, non-violent
alternatives were not, and if those options even existed in the first place.
Here we might divide the question of instrumentality into two: the question of viability
(why the option to use violence was available from a practical standpoint in the first place) and
the question of timeliness (why the choice to exercise that option was made when it was). Since
the viability of violence in a particular case may change with time, the properties at work in
either of these concepts are no doubt related.
Part of the question of viability may be addressed through an assessment of governmental
capacity. Tilly (2003) argues that the ability of a given democratic regime to prevent violence
within its area of jurisdiction depends on its ability to address claims made against it, or between
citizens, effectively (41-52). High-capacity democratic regimes routinize most of the claim-
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making process by allowing only a small number of rigorously enforced inroads through which
citizens are allowed to make claims against each other or the government (Tilly 2003:50). These
inroads include the court system, the police, and a variety of other more specific state agencies.
Routine claims may lead to conflict, but those conflicts rarely turn violent. Accordingly, we can
expect government agents to only use violence selectively and therefore rarely when resolving
conflict (Tilly 2003:52). In contrast, states with low-capacity democratic regimes should exhibit
more violence as initially non-violent conflicts turn violent frequently (Tilly 2003:52). Since the
government itself is ineffectual, we should also expect it to have less involvement at every level
of conflict: as third-party arbiters or managers of violence after it has begun (Tilly 2003:52).
Yet the capacity of a given regime is not always universal within its area of jurisdiction.
How effective a regime is at managing or preventing conflict in a given area is determined by its
physical presence in that area. This consideration is important when examining states where the
regime itself is strong, but its presence in certain locales is extremely weak. (South Africa, with
its numerous undeveloped townships, is an example of such a case.)
Assuming that a theory of governmental can be applied to the internal power dynamics of
a weak sub-region within a strong state, we would expect specific outcomes. Between residents,
we would expect a great deal of violence as they resolved claims amongst each other. However
uncertainties arise when we consider the channels which residents of the low-capacity sub-region
could access to advance a claim with the high-capacity national government. Being at least tied
to a strong democratic regime, residents’ expectations for the state would likely be high, but the
apparatus of the state, including the police, the court system and any other government agencies,
would be distant or ineffectual, even as the state sought to increase its presence.
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As government increased its capacity within the sub-region, local stakeholders may be
unwilling to cooperate, even resistant, if their own control overlapped with the proposed gains
for the state. By the same token, local stakeholders may willingly cooperate with an expansion
of government into their area if it guaranteed access to resources not otherwise available. In this
latter scenario, expansion of government power would proceed as a sort of partnership between
state agents and residents, albeit one primarily directed by local stakeholders. Nonetheless, even
an initially welcome expansion of government power could lead to conflict if the circumstances
which allowed for the creation of that partnership changed. Therefore, any expansion of state
power, welcome or not, would expose state agents to a potential conflict with locals powers, and
with it, local methods of conflict resolution, including violence. Yet if widespread violence was
committed by locals in spite of or in defiance of powers which had been willfully ceded to state
agents previously (i.e., widespread vigilantism), that shift could be considered a termination of
the partnership and a reassertion of local control by residents.
Following this assessment of governmental capacity, we might answer the question of
timeliness with an application of social movement theory and the role of political opportunity.
Recent conclusions in sociology have demonstrated that social movements “develop and succeed
not because they emerge to address new grievances, but rather because something in the larger
political context allows existing grievances to be heard” (della Porta 2008:223). Opportunities
can include a variety of events and circumstances, such as “regime shifts, periods of political
instability, or changes in the composition of elites”— all of which may provide “openings” for
social movements to take hold and gain traction (della Porta 2008:223). Applying this theory of
political opportunity to periods of collective violence, we can adjust the question, asking not why
violence happens, but what circumstances allow it to gain traction, endure, and take hold as a
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social movement in its own right, thus becoming a period of violence, instead of just an incident
of it. That adjustment makes room for the possibility that, in a given case, group violence had
always been a viable option, but its exercisers only became politically motivated and numerous
because of changes in the greater political landscape.
A final area worth considering is the relationship between participants of group violence
and their targets. Studies conducted on the Rwandan Genocide, the collapse of the Balkans, and
other intra-national conflicts in the last two decades demonstrate that what appear to be ethnic or
national targets can actually be politically constructed. Accordingly, specific social groups may
be targeted not because of their ethnicity or nationality, per se, but because of the political
interests they represent, are associated with, or otherwise stand to benefit through their continued
presence or existence (Calhoun 1993; Mamdani 2002). This realization exposes a further limit
of cultural analyses of violent conflict: such analyses restrict a reading of instrumentality to a
question of motives—that is, a so-called “root cause” or a fundamental conflict between parties
that vertically precedes the violent outbreak. Yet focusing on why the targets themselves were
chosen may be beside the point. The real question may be about the horizontal factors which
allow for violence to catch on at a particular time and spread rapidly.
Research Methodology
Applying this framework to an analysis of the May 2008 period of xenophobic violence
is foremost a task of connecting the political wants of the participants to the events themselves.
Having made those connections theoretically sound, we might understand why the exercise of
group violence against— or the protection of— local immigrant populations was considered an
option for advancing those interests at the time. I chose the two townships of Alexandra and
Khutsong because the combination of their structural and cultural similarities and the contrasting
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difference in outcome exhibited by either during the period clearly present the problem in social
science which I seek to resolve in this paper. The period was a nationwide phenomenon, and
immigrant communities throughout the country were subjected to violence. Alexandra maintains
theoretical significance in that it was the first township where residents acted violently against
immigrants in May. It was also one of the townships where the violence was at its most intense,
and most enduring.
The theory upon which my analysis hinges is fundamentally about opportunity brought
on by conditions of political instability. In that respect, focusing an analysis on Alexandra is
valuable because it restricts an assessment of the preconditions of instability to conditions other
than those resulting from the prevalence of civil disorder as a result of the period itself. Though
the rationale for natives to attack immigrants may have been the same all townships including
Alexandra, the initiative exhibited by those in Alexandra may have provided the impetus to act
elsewhere. Khutsong also provides a unique case since it was evidently the only township in or
near Gauteng to initiate a large-scale effort to protect its immigrant population.
In evaluating a political opportunity and the disparate ways in which it was exploited in
either township, both the localized political interests at work and the corresponding actions
require contextualization within the greater (in this case, national) political circumstances which
beset them. Moreover, since the questions at hand regard collective interests and collective
action, it is only fitting that we evaluate actions as the united effort of a single entity within each
township for the purpose of that analysis. For all those reasons, I have elected not to base my
research on interview data of my own. Instead, I construct a political narrative for each of the
two townships using a diverse array of viewpoints, including journalistic accounts from domestic
and international news agencies, government data (where and when it is deemed accurate), and
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research conducted by non-governmental organizations, most notably by the Human Sciences
Research Council (HSRC) in Pretoria, South Africa.
Background to the Violence and its Political Context
The period of xenophobic violence (known hereafter as “the period”) began on May 11,
2008 in the Beirut neighborhood, an informal settlement area with a large immigrant population,
in the eastern part of the Alexandra Township north of downtown Johannesburg in Gauteng
province. It lasted twenty days and spread across South Africa, gaining attention in local and
international news media and intense concern in the national government.
On May 14, the South African Broadcasting Corporation reported that residents had been
pelting police with stones, resisting verbal demands to cease their attacks (News24 2008). Police
said they were overwhelmed, afraid to confront the mobs for fear of gunfire. On the same day,
the main opposition party in Parliament called on the ANC to send the army into Alexandra for
the first time since Apartheid, arguing correctly that South African Police Services (SAPS) had
already lost control of the situation (SAPA 2008c). After five days in Alexandra, the attacks
spread to across the country. President Mbeki vocally condemned the attacks but remained quiet
about how to resolve the emergency (M&G & SAPA 2008a). In every township that violence
appeared, reports came in of police being either ignored or overwhelmed, cars and shacks being
torched, roads being blocked off, and immigrant-owned businesses being looted, suggesting the
emergence of a nationwide breakdown of civil order (SAPA 2008a; SAPA 2008b).
On May 19, Zuma announced that he had heard widespread reports a phenomenon that
would deeply trouble the ANC: mobs of attackers were seen chanting his trademark campaign
song “Umshini Wami,” in Alexandra and elsewhere (Mbanjwa 2008). The statement confirmed
existing journalistic accounts, some of which even traced the singing of “Umshini Wami” to the
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first hour of xenophobic violence in Alexandra (Rubin 2008). Zuma denounced the attacks and
expressed his personal disgust with the song’s new usage (Mbanjwa 2008).
By May 21, Mbeki could not deny that the nation was experiencing a state of emergency
as the violence had undeniably spread beyond Gauteng when large mobs were reported attacking
immigrants in Durban, in KwaZulu-Natal province for the first time (McGreal 2008a). 300
arrests had been made in relation to the violence, but the Gauteng premier said the situation there
was still “dire” (McGreal 2008b). Finally, Mbeki ordered the South African National Defense
Force into Alexandra to assist police (M&G & SAPA 2008b).
On May 31, SAPS reported “a quiet weekend” with “few known incidents” of antiimmigrant violence, signifying an end to the period (SAPA & AFP 2008). A final tally counted
62 dead and around 560 injured (SAPA & AFP 2008). In Gauteng alone, more than 16,000
people, including around 1,000 from Alexandra— mostly foreign immigrants— were internally
displaced, (HSRC 2008:14, ARP 2008:1). In Alexandra, the violence had lasted for the entire
period. Despite direct threats to the contrary, it had not spread outside Beirut and a nearby area
of recently built government houses partly occupied by immigrants called Extension 7. In that
neighborhood, mobs raided 36 houses, nine of which were occupied by immigrant families. All
the immigrant families were forcibly evicted (ARP 2008:2).
Where there was Violence: Alexandra Township before the Period
Alexandra is one of the poorest townships in South Africa with an unemployment rate at
around 60 percent, nearly triple provincial average (Census SA in PPTPPSA 2004:8). With an
estimated 15 percent of its population of around 850,000 people having been born outside South
Africa, Alexandra claims one of the largest immigrant populations in the country (ARP 2008:1).
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In 2001, Mbeki launched the Alexandra Renewal Project (ARP) to improve the township,
partly by replacing informal settlements with formal government housing (ARP 2001). A goal
was set for 22,250 total households, 44 percent of which would be RDP “give-away” units to be
issued to homeless residents (ARP 2006). By May 2008, 1,400 RDP houses had been built in the
Extension 7 area of Alexandra with others under construction (ARP 2008). In accordance with
law, the ARP did not discriminate against immigrants when allocating services so long as the
applicant had legal residency in the country (NDH 2004; ARP 2008). From its outset, this policy
of allocating houses to immigrants was unpopular with residents. Yet while relations between
Alexandra natives and the government were at least existent, the same could not be said about
relations between natives and the government an hour west in Khutsong.
Where there was Peace: Khutsong Township before the Period
While Khutsong did not exhibit a single incident of xenophobic violence for the entire
period, during the time before after the period, the area was overrun with violence. Residents in
the township had been engaging in a violent anti-government revolt since the municipality to
which it belonged was demarcated from Gauteng and made part of poorer North West Province
in December, 2006. Exactly why the South African parliament chose to demarcate Merafong is
still unclear, though events leading up to the final decision indicate strongly that it would be an
unpopular one.1 In parliament, the decision had instantly pit ANC leadership against its own
members representing Merafong, who, in an unusual move, defied the party to support the will of
their constituents and repeatedly tried to block the legislation (Mde & Brown 2006).
1

Merafong was a cross-provincial municipality, meaning that it straddled the border of Gauteng and North
West Province, making service delivery complicated. Since the government had already declared that it wanted to
eliminate all cross-provincial municipalities before the March, 2006 election, demarcation was anticipated by the
public. A committee in parliament was formed to recommend a decision for which of the two provinces to
consolidate Merafong into and concluded very publicly that it should be fully incorporated into Gauteng, as
expected and desired by residents in Merafong. But just a week before the decision was legislated, the committee
reversed its position without announcement (Mabuza 2008).
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In Khutsong, violent resistance began almost immediately and once more pitted the ANC
against its allies in the area (Blair 2008). The local branches of the Congress of South African
Trade Unions (COSATU) — a committed ally of the ANC— railed against the party and began
organizing what would eventually become a mass resistance against the government. By the
time of the boycotted March, 2006 elections, 13 of the 17 local councilors had been driven from
their homes by arson, the library had been burned down, and polling stations across the township
had been firebombed (Blair 2006). In scenes reminiscent of the Apartheid era, armored cars and
police helicopters patrolled the streets and skies (Blair 2006). When the election happened, only
300 of 30,000 registered voters in Khutsong cast a ballot (IRIN 2007).
Taking Back the Township in Alexandra and Khutsong
Though it should not be considered a causal factor for the period of violence, the fact is
that poor, urban black South Africans are a highly xenophobic demographic, and the prevalence
of xenophobia had been rising for more than a decade at the time of the period in May (Crush &
Pendleton 2004:15, 17; Phlip 2008). 47 percent of urban residents living in informal settlements,
said they “welcomed no foreigners” in 2007. Yet while poor urban blacks apparently did not
like foreigners and considered them a problem, evidence suggests that this group considered the
presence of foreign immigrants a symptom of deeper government inadequacies—inadequacies
which evidently demanded they take the situation into their own hands.
An HSRC study conducted immediately after the period found that in focus groups,
natives in Alexandra and other participant townships were outraged with government failures to
significantly reduce crime and provide jobs (HSRC 2008). In both these areas, immigrants were
said to be either the cause of a problem which the government had failed to counteract (crime),
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or their competition was seen as a side effect of the government’s failure to create enough of the
contested resource to go around (jobs).
Regarding crime, the HSRC study confirmed existing research which suggested native
township residents considered the immigrant presence to be synonymous with crime.2 However,
the study went further to say that natives were more upset with corrupt SAPS officers (allowing
foreign criminals to escape arrest with bribes) and generally failing to substantively reduce crime
(which they blamed on immigrants in the first place) (HSRC 2008:28). Respondents also blamed
government for the high number of immigrants in the first place, specifically citing its failures to
enforce national borders and curb legal and illegal immigration (HSRC 2008:29). Respondents
were also angered by Mbeki’s failure earlier that year to resolve the political and economic crises
in Zimbabwe, which had spurned much of the immigration in the previous eight years from that
country (HSRC 2008:8).
In Alexandra and other townships, the HSRC report found that the immigrant presence in
government housing had incited some of the most severe outrage among natives (HSRC 2008:
48). Native residents believed the government should prioritize new housing for them. But that
immigrants could occupy and were occupying new government-built houses suggested that the
national government was either ignoring a moral obligation to the basic needs of South African
poor, or it was simply incapable of seeing those obligations through.3 As with the issue of jobs,
the presence of immigrants exacerbated competition for government housing. Yet that there was
competition at all highlighted substantial failure on part of the ARP to build enough houses in the
2

In 2006, 66 percent of respondents to one survey said that a major incentive for immigrants to come to the
country was “to commit crimes.” One in five said that crime was the only reason. A mere 11 percent said the main
reason immigrants came was “to seek a better life” (Phlip 2008).
3
It is worth noting here that not all the immigrants who were occupying government houses did so by legal
means. The HSRC report found that many natives in Alexandra were angered by corruption within the housing
administration which had facilitated an underground subletting market with some residents renting out houses
assigned to them to undocumented immigrants for profit (HSRC 2008:37).
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first place. Both of these problems could be attributed to the government. For natives, fixing the
problem would therefore involve a reassertion of local control where the government had failed.
To understand why violent uprising was elected as an acceptable means of dealing with those
problems, a critical evaluation of the relationship between natives in Alexandra and the national
government is necessary.
Governmental Capacity and the Case of Alexandra
With an explicit legal system, an organized court system and a competent police force,
South Africa contrasts to most of the rest of Africa in that it has many of the hallmarks of a state
with a high-capacity democratic regime. However, most of that capacity does not register in
Alexandra. The first police station in Alexandra did not open until 2003, and at the time it only
stationed 290 personnel at any given time to police the township’s estimated 850,000 civilians, a
police to civilian ratio of about 1:3000, or slightly more than ten times the national average in
2008 of 1:345 (Joburg News 2003; SAPS 2008a).4 SAPS statistics show no significant decline
in crime after the station’s opening (SAPS 2008b).5 We might therefore consider Alexandra a
low-capacity sub-region within the jurisdiction of the high-capacity regime of the South African
national government. If the corresponding theories articulated in the previous section are right,
we can assume that government power in the township was only expanded through a partnership
between state agents and residents, wherein responsibilities typical of a democratic regime were
only ceded to state agents at the will of local stakeholders.

4

Even more unfortunate is that the figure of 290 includes secretaries, clerks and other non-patrol-officers,
meaning that the actual number of officers on the street is lower still (Joburg News 2003).
5
A curious, but undated statement issued on the website of a Johannesburg-based holdings firm provides some
evidence that the station also suffered from under-funding since its opening and benefited from a fundraiser at a golf
tournament hosted by the company. From the statement: “Due to a shortage of funds, the Alexandra Police Station
relies on donations from the private sector, including organisations and companies” (Micromega N.d.).
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As in a high-capacity democratic state, residents had certain options available for making
their political will known to the national government such as voting and organizing, and in 2008,
these options were not lost on native residents of Alexandra. The township has historically been
and continues to be one of the most politicized in South Africa, with more than 70 percent of
residents belonging to a political party or organization (PPTPPSA 2004:1).6 Most are members
of the ANC and in the last two elections, Alexandra has overwhelmingly voted for that party (du
Preez 2008).
This last truth would appear to challenge the assertion that residents in Alexandra were
disillusioned with the ANC, but in reality, the situation is somewhat more complex. Because of
the political dominance of the party and its historically central role in the anti-Apartheid struggle,
the party maintains a loyal following among even the most frustrated of voters. After Zuma
became president of the ANC in 2007, voters had the option of being pro-ANC without being
pro-government for the first time since Apartheid. In other words, one could support the ANC
but explicitly claim loyalty to and a preference for Zuma, since Zuma had built a platform on
dismantling Mbeki from within the party itself. As Mbeki’s influence declined with Zuma’s
ascent from December 2007 onwards, to the point that Mbeki became a lame duck, that duality
became an even more acceptable position among party members. However complex the political
loyalties of many of Alexandra’s voters may have been, then, it would be fair to say those
loyalties remained strong, and that voters had them sorted out for themselves. At the time of the
period in May 2008, it is evident that many attackers saw their work as an endorsement of
Zuma’s presidential bid. The singing of “Umshini Wami”— plainly an expression of support for

6

Combined with either the estimated 15 percent foreign-born (and therefore disenfranchised) figure, or the
high percentage of youth (of whom a large percentage are also disenfranchised) and the figure of people who can
and do belong to a political party is actually quite enormous.
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Zuma — by attackers as they moved through townships should be taken as a deliberate attempt
to connect an anti-government message with a pro-Zuma message.
Reports of these violent endorsements should not be taken as evidence that all natives in
Alexandra or even all the attackers were in support of Zuma. Nonetheless, it seems indisputable
that the people of Alexandra were overwhelmingly favorable of change in government in May
2008. For many, Zuma’s populist message was worth believing and supporting. Others may
have been more cautious about Zuma, or were disillusioned with the entire ANC establishment
and not willing to express support for any of its candidates. But even the most fervent opponent
of the ANC would have recognized that Zuma’s ascendancy to the South African presidency was
as inevitable as Mbeki’s fall from it. A shift at the highest level of government was approaching,
and whatever one’s political affiliation, ensuring that the inheritors of that change understood the
wants and needs of the people of Alexandra as leaders of the then-current government had failed
to was in everyone’s interest. Violently evicting immigrants from Alexandra in defiance of the
government was a way to make those interests known loudly and clearly.
But the campaign did meet some immediate objectives its instigators as well. The fact is
that the evictors did oppose the presence of immigrants in their areas. Thus, forcing a thousand
of them out of the township undoubtedly had some tangible short-term benefit. But aside from
that gain, the campaign sent a message to the national government: that Alexandra’s partnership
with it had effectively ended. In reclaiming those means of control which had been earlier ceded
to the government willingly, residents became the local housing authority, immigration authority,
and the police where the government had failed to adequately fill those roles. Reasserting power
demonstrated not only government ineptitude, but also the underlying autonomy of the township
itself. Ultimate control of Alexandra was not in the hands of the state, if it had ever been.
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This violent shift against the national government in Alexandra should not be read as an
attempt at secession. Although the relationship was severed, new leaders in government who
were more attuned to local wants could restore the partnership between the state and Alexandra’s
residents. Government still had resources which the township did not, and those resources could
be amassed to the benefit of the people. But any future government presence in the township
would have to recognize that such a partnership could only be restored on the terms of residents.
Otherwise, new leaders risked having another uprising on their hands in the future. Here, we can
see that by reasserting local control, residents exploited the opportunity provided by a stagnated
leadership transition to make their own political interests known to both South Africa’s existing
and future leadership.
Back when Alexandra Loved the Government
An extraordinary comparison to 2008 can be found in Alexandra less than a year after the
ANC first took power. For a period of weeks between December 1994 and January 1995, armed
gangs, working with an assortment of local civic organizations, collected and evicted immigrants
who they claimed were living in the country illegally in a campaign similar to the one observed
in May 2008. Yet in a total contrast to 20008, the gangs marched the captive immigrants to a
police station in nearby Wynburg and demanded their immediate deportation (HRW 1998:135).
A spokesperson for one supporting organization said, “We are simply doing the job of the police
by handing them [undocumented immigrants] over and asking them to be deported back to their
own countries” (Debutshena in HRW 1998:135). No reports of an appeal to police remotely like
this happened in May 2008.
Why the difference? The months following the 1994 election which ended Apartheid and
brought the ANC into power was marked by jubilance in South Africa. Urban blacks especially,
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such as those in Alexandra, who had suffered the most of any social group under the old regime,
believed they had gained politically. For the first time, natives in Alexandra believed they had a
government accountable to them and willing to prioritize their needs. Accordingly, the 1994-95
campaign exhibited a mutual, if citizen-directed partnership between the state and anti-immigrant
groups, with local gangs functioning as part of a joint mission with police. Campaign organizers
simply trusted that the immigrants would be deported en masse. In fact, most of those left at the
station were repatriated (Debutshena in HRW 1998:136). Flash forward to May 2008 and after
more than a decade of ineffective housing initiatives, high crime, rampant corruption, ambiguous
immigration policies and a collapsing political situation in Zimbabwe— already a cause for mass
immigration but which Mbeki denied was a crisis at all (McGreal 2008b) — and it becomes clear
why the trust poor urban blacks once held in the government had by then virtually disappeared.
The Khutsong Comparison
In many accounts of the period in May 2008, poverty and frustration with the government
services were cited as the primary causes of both existing xenophobic attitudes and the violence
associated with it that year. Yet the reality of a nearby township that was structurally similar to
Alexandra and equally outraged with the national government reporting not only a complete lack
of xenophobic incidents during the period, but actually protecting foreign immigrants, poses an
outright challenge to those assertions. In searching for a link between poverty and violence,
some elaborate attempts were made to propose a theory. One of the more thoughtful of these
came through The Christian Science Monitor, whose reporters suggested that a surge in food
prices not long before May 11 had pushed some people in Alexandra over the edge, turning their
existing xenophobic attitudes into violence (Baldauf 2008; Yusuf 2008). The theory was backed
with data collected through the aforementioned HSRC report, which said that residents from
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Alexandra and elsewhere had become more stressed since the price surge (HSRC 2008: 45). Yet
the rise in food prices was global, and any affect it had on levels of stress or quality of life would
have been felt among the impoverished in Khutsong as well, of which there were evidently
many. The unemployment rate for Khutsong, estimated by trade unions, was around 40 percent
in 2006 (Carroll 2006) — not as high as the estimated rate in Alexandra, but still very high.
The state of housing was also abysmal in Khutsong. Although the proportion of informal
housing was far lower in Khutsong than in Alexandra, the township still exhibited a number of
informal settlements at the time of demarcation (Carroll 2006). Since the demarcation, prospects
for housing improvements which the government had promised earlier had become significantly
worse, since the switch meant that the required funds would have to come from the cash-strapped
North West provincial government (Blair 2006). Alexandra had a “Renewal Project” to amass
dedicated resources for new housing projects and the guarantee of presidential oversight. Even if
the process of constructing and allocating houses was slow and largely ineffectual, houses were
being built. In being demarcated, Khutsong effectively got the anti-Renewal Project: a hold on
promises to build more housing, and outright neglect from the national government.
Crime rates are also very high in Khutsong and exceed Alexandra in key areas according
to the most recent SAPS statistics. Khutsong has a smaller population than Alexandra (150,000
versus an estimated 850,000), but the per capita murder rate in 2003/2004 was virtually the same
in both (~1/7000). It should be noted that the attempted murder rate in 2003/2004 was higher in
Alexandra (~1/4800 vs. ~1/7,900) however the rate of “assault with the intent to inflict grievous
bodily harm” (a more accurate description of the majority of the attacks during the May period
than “attempted murder”) was significantly higher in Khutsong that year (1/340 vs. 1/624). The
statistics are similar for the preceding decade (SAPS 2008a; SAPS 2008b). Khutsong was also
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rich with immigrants. Though exact figures are unavailable, estimates have put the immigrant
presence between 5 and 10 percent of its total— less than in Alexandra, but still constituting a
major part of the community and putting the township far above the national average.
It should be noted that Khutsong does exhibit a number of structural factors which make
a non-violent or even anti-violent stance during the period at least a little unsurprising. Foremost
among these is that the township served as a labor pool for many nearby gold mines. The mines
constitute one reason why Khutsong attracted so many immigrants, since the South African gold
mining industry has been historically upheld by foreign labor, constituting up to 40 percent of its
labor force in 1991 (Crush et al. 1991). Unlike the informal economy of Alexandra, the relative
equality of opportunity provided by a gold mine meant that immigrants would not have posed an
economic threat to the majority of Khutsong’s population. South Africa has some of the most
technically challenging gold mines in the world, which make mining skills vastly more desirable.
This means that pay scales in South African mines are dependent on a miner’s skills, with the
more experienced miners earning more money than less the experienced, less skilled newcomers.
Therefore, a flood of immigrants from Zimbabwe into Khutsong would have not threatened the
earnings of miners; native residents would have had no economic incentive to deter immigration.
Like in any mining town in South Africa, unions also featured strongly in the life of men
in Khutsong, most importantly, the local branch of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM),
part of the organizational powerhouse, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).
Since NUM membership is open to all mineworkers and because of its fraternal, openly socialist,
fervently anti-racist and anti-xenophobic rhetoric, it is logical that the organization would have
been instrumental in forming collective bonds between immigrants and non-immigrants— bonds
which, when under threat, non-immigrants would have been willing to protect. But the presence
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of unions and a lack of economic incentives to drive out immigrants cannot alone explain why
Khutsong residents protected their immigrants or rallied in the street to demonstrate their support
in May 2008. Reuters reported that the EPRM platinum mine east of Alexandra, where a number
of unionized immigrants were employed, had been “hit hard” by anti-immigrant mobs targeting
worker settlements around the mine (Macharia 2008). By May 23, twelve days after the period
began, two of the mine’s workers had been killed and rumors of attacks were flying at the nearby
Lonmin platinum mine where many foreign workers had elected to take their vacation and leave
until things settled down (Macharia 2008).
It appears then that a purely structural analysis of the protections in Khutsong is a façade
with many cracks, but a culturalist analysis fails to hold up any better. If a cultural disposition
towards violence was a causal factor to the period, we would expect that township which acted
violently towards its immigrant population in May 2008 (in this case, Alexandra) to have more
thoroughly exhibited that culture than its more peaceful alternative (in this case, Khutsong) in the
preceding years. Crime statistics alone strongly suggest that levels of violence were comparable
in both townships.7 Yet that these statistics were taken before Khutsong underwent a period of
widespread civil unrest which overlapped with the period of xenophobic violence is especially
damning. Once more, a deeper analysis is necessary to grasp what happened and why.
Theorizing Peace & the Politics of Protection in Khutsong
The demarcation of the Merafong was the single greatest political calamity in Khutsong
since the Apartheid era. Its effect on the political consciousness of the township’s natives was
total, and was the foremost consideration in every aspect of their political workings, including
their counteraction to xenophobic violence in May 2008. By protecting immigrants, Khutsong
7

In fact, prior to 2008, it seems apparent that Khutsong was not above xenophobic violence, either. In
2007, anti-government protests turned violent and resulted in attacks on several Somali-owned shops in events
which some analysts say precipitated the period in 2008 (IRIN 2008).
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residents similarly exploited an opportunity provided by the stagnated leadership transition in the
national government. The demarcation divided the ANC against itself, its supporters, and its
historic allies, most notably COSATU. One statement issued by the local branch of COSATU
accused the government of not caring “about the views of our people, including our children,”
and calls the ANC “dictatorial” (COSATU 2007). Such strong language from a historic ally is
illustrative of the severity of conflict between the two groups over Khutsong.8
But like many South Africans, COSATU’s outrage with the government and the ANC did
not translate into a total break with either. The fiasco in Khutsong was not the first major dispute
between COSATU and top ANC leaders. In 1999, COSATU leaders had a falling out with
president Mbeki, after which time Mbeki refused to meet with any trade unionists for over a year
(Gumede 2007:395). During that time, Zuma emerged as a conduit between COSATU leaders
and Mbeki, making it somewhat unsurprising that COSATU all but endorsed Zuma during his
political rise. Similarly, leaders in the anti-demarcation movement in Khutsong voiced their own
cautious gratitude for Zuma’s bid for the South African presidency before meeting with ANC
delegates in March 2008 (Tabane 2008). As one analyst put it, the people of Khutsong told the
ANC “We are not against the ANC, but for the people” (Brown 2008). A similar conjecture
could be made about the people of Alexandra in May 2008.
As immigrants started to be attacked in townships in Gauteng and government control in
Alexandra began to break down entirely, Mbeki’s weakened regime looked increasingly weaker.
COSATU and the leaders of an organization founded to represent the interests of municipality,
the Merafong Demarcation Forum (MDF), already considered allies of the people against the
national government in Khutsong, had an opportunity to make a stand against the regime in the
8

COSATU is part of the ANC tripartite alliance which spearheaded the anti- Apartheid struggle. In the
modern South African flag, adopted in 1994, the green, black and yellow middle arrow symbolizes the ANC, while
the adjacent blue stripe symbolizes COSATU. Red is for the South African Communist Party.
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president’s hour of desperation. Like the campaign waged in Alexandra, protection was a way
for these two groups to assert local control in spite of the national government in Khutsong. By
protecting a group of people at the exact same time when the government had proven it could
not, the campaign in Khutsong made the government look ineffective and powerless in a way
that may have been even more effective than causing it instability. After two and a half years of
firebombing, the campaign of protection may have been a new approach for outraged citizens in
Khutsong: highlighting government ineffectiveness while showcasing the organizational capacity
of local groups for positive action through non-violent coordination.
Local organizers may have chosen to protect immigrants out of their own self-interest as
well. Since immigrants constituted disenfranchised section of the population of Khutsong, it is
possible they were not as committed to the anti-demarcation cause as their native peers. But as
violence spread, protection may have been offered in exchange for the promise of future support.
This is plausible because the MDF was the organization to lead the campaign of protection in
Khutsong (Pithouse 2008). The organization also had leadership ties with COSATU—the leader
of the MDF was also a leader in the local branch of the COSATU-affiliated teachers union.
There is additionally evidence of an explicit will on part of the MDF to not only protect
immigrants, but to connect that project to its original political mission. In May 2008, The MDF
joined the Coalition Against Xenophobia, an association of groups that drafted several public
statements during the period either criticizing the government or expressing committed support
for immigrants. Of 46 groups to join or support the Coalition, almost all others had broad-based
national membership or operated only in Gauteng (CAX 2008a:2-3). On May 24, the Coalition
sent an open memorandum to the Premier of Gauteng broadly addressing “the South African
government.” It listed four demands, at the top of which was a demand that authorities “Provide
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immediate emergency support for individuals and families displaced by the current violence”
(CAX 2008 a:2). The MDF was a signer to that statement. On May 25, the MDF also signed a
“Pledge of Solidarity Against Xenophobia,” again drafted by the Coalition, committing it to do
everything possible to “stop this violence” (CAX 2008b). On June 6, long after the violence had
subsided, some 5,000 Khutsong residents marched with MDF leaders to ANC headquarters to
present a list of complaints. Most were related to the demarcation, yet one of the grievances was
a demand for Mbeki and the Minister of Intelligence to resign for having failed to “predict” the
xenophobic attacks in May (Butjwana 2008).
Why did Khutsong residents, untouched by the period of violence, approach the ANC
making such an explicit connection between their stances on the demarcation and xenophobia?
A likely reason is that the MDF wished to make a case against the ANC and the government, to
say simply that for all its anti-xenophobic rhetoric, the government could not back its words with
action. That message would have meshed with the results of the campaign of protection in May,
which, in a way, proved that Khutsong residents, COSATU and, most notably, the MDF were
simply better at protecting people than the government was. Like the evictions in Alexandra, the
protections in Khutsong were about making a statement about government ineptitude and, more
fundamentally, reasserting local control in spite of government failures.
Conclusion: Two Ways to Defy a Weakened State
By using violent means to take control of the township, the native people of Alexandra
both asserted their township’s autonomy and demonstrated that their willing partnership with the
government had ended with their patience. The government was weak and the township revolted,
twisting the arm of the state and daring the state to stop it. In Khutsong, a different scene ensued
in a deliberate contrast to the violence in Alexandra and other townships, as renegade political
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and community leaders worked with native residents to resist the state by protecting immigrants
in ways that the state had failed to. Looming above either township was a crisis of leadership in
the national government which led to political instability. For native residents in both Khutsong
and Alexandra, outraged with the national government and intent on sending a message to it, the
crisis was nothing less than a political opportunity. To exploit that opportunity, residents of both
townships took advantage of the inherent vulnerability and political centrality of their respective
immigrant populations— not merely to settle an old score or protect old friends, but to make a
point with them because they embodied all that was immoral and dysfunctional with the national
government of the time. At the same time, these actors reasserted power in the areas of their
domain where the government had failed to live up to the responsibilities assigned to it. Only in
Alexandra did residents act violently, but in both, the underlying rationale and the processes at
work were the same. The difference in outcome cannot be explained by culture, as culture would
assume a universal outcome, nor do mere economic incentives explain the difference. How the
residents of each township acted or reacted during the period in May, and why they chose to
mobilize at the time that they did can only be explained by the political conditions which beset
residents at the time. Nothing else can complete the picture.
There are broader theoretical questions raised following these assertions which may
inspire future research. Uncertainties remain about the power dynamics of states which exhibit
divided governmental capacity. South Africa is one example of the former, but there are others.
More research is needed to understand how residents and governments in those states interact,
not just during times of civil breakdown but at all times, including— perhaps especially— during
the process of routine claim making.
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A Note on Sources
The data for this paper largely came from the online journalistic accounts listed above. You will
notice many of these sources are referenced to one media outlet but the URL is from another
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website. This is the case in two particular news outlets, the South African Press Association
(SAPA) and allAfrica.com. The reason for this is that SAPA, like the Associated Press in the
United States, only publishes stories through other news outlets. On the flip side, allAfrica.com
collects stories from other news sites and publishes them on its website.
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